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Background: Payers are increasingly turning to Prospective Payment Systems (PPSs) because they incentivize
efficiency, but their application to emergency departments (EDs) is difficult because of the high level of uncertainty
and variability in the cost of treating each patient.
To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first attempt at defining a PPS for this part of hospital activity.
Methods: Data were specifically collected for this study and relate to 1011 patients who were triaged at an ED of a
major Italian hospital, during 1 week in December 2010.
The cost for each patient was analytically estimated by adding up several components: 1) physician and other staff
costs that were imputed on the basis of the time each physician claimed to have spent treating the patient; 2) the cost
for each test/treatment each patient actually underwent; 3) overhead costs, shared among patients using the time
elapsed between first examination and discharge from the ED.
Results: The distribution of costs by triage code shows that, although the average cost increases across the four triage
groups, the variance within each code is quite high. The maximum cost for a yellow code is €1074.7, compared with
€680 for red, the most serious code. Using cluster analysis, the red code cluster is enveloped by yellow, and their costs
are therefore indistinguishable, while green codes span all cost groups. This suggests that triage code alone is not a
good proxy for the patient cost, and that other cost drivers need to be included.
Conclusions: Crude triage codes cannot be used to define PPSs because they are not sufficiently correlated with costs
and are characterized by large variances. However, if combined with other information, such as the number of
laboratory and non-laboratory tests/examinations, it is possible to define cost groups that are sufficiently homogeneous
to be reimbursed prospectively. This should discourage strategic behavior and allow the ED to break even or create
profits, which can be reinvested to improve services. The study provides health policy administrators with a new and
feasible tool to implement prospective payment for EDs, and improve planning and cost control.
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Emergency departments (EDs) are responsible for a large
share of overall hospitalization and diagnostic activity,
but little research exists on their cost and their impact
on healthcare expenditure [1]. ED treatments are patient
specific and the variance in cost of each case is fairly high
and difficult to predict. For this reason, most healthcare
systems use retrospective systems to reimburse their
activity [2,3]. However, cost reimbursement has several
drawbacks: it does not allow the costs of EDs to be* Correspondence: montefiori@unige.it
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumcontrolled and it may allow hospitals to ‘play’ strategic-
ally [4,5].
In a context where hospital admissions are paid for
using Prospective Payment Systems (PPSs), providers
can shift costs to the purchaser by timing the admission of
patients from ED to another hospital ward. Alternatively,
patients may undergo diagnostic tests in the ED that
should have been routinely performed after admission
to a ward, and would not then have been reimbursed
separately.
For this reason, some authors have proposed the use
of a PPS for EDs, but the high level of uncertainty and
variability in the resources needed to treat each patiented Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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objective. Despite these difficulties, there are countries
who are experimenting with new solutions to reimburse
the activity of their EDs. For instance, Australia has
recently proposed a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)
based system [7] and Belgium finances part of its ED
activity prospectively [8,9].
EDs generally use triage codes for priority setting that
are related to a patient’s level of severity (clinical need).
At an international level, there are several different triage
systems. One common system, used for instance in the
United States, is the Emergency Severity Index (ESI) where
patients are assigned to one of five different severity
groups, according to the observation of different variables
such as vital functions, life or organ threat, and expected
resource use (e.g., x-rays, laboratory tests/examinations,
and consultations) [10]. ESI-1 refers to the most urgent
patients and ESI-5 to the least.
In this work, we will refer to a different algorithm for
prioritizing patients, which is used by many EDs in
Europe. It is based on four color codes that measure to
what extent the patient’s condition is critical. Each code
has a color tag: red codes (the most urgent patients)
must be attended to immediately, for yellow and green
codes some waiting is possible, while white codes (the
least urgent) represent an inappropriate use of the ED.
Several studies have been proposed to test the reliability of
the triage system in defining the actual medical urgency
of patients [11] and its ability to predict hospitalizations or
mortality [12]. Other contributions focus on the ability
of triage codes to predict actual resource use in terms, for
instance, length of stay, hospitalization, or x ray [10,13,14].
The present paper differs from the existing literature
because it starts from an analytical cost allocation of the
actual costs incurred by hospitals when treating patients
in an ED. The individual cost is then used to propose a
PPS for an ED. To the best of our knowledge, our work
represents the first attempt to define a PPS for this
important part of hospital activity.
Methods
Study design
One of the most important shortcomings of previous
studies is their inability to determine the actual cost for
each patient accessing an ED. In this study, we have
tried to overcome this problem using a unique database
that matches patient information with data specifically
collected for this purpose on the intensity and the cost
of care. In this way, we can determine the cost of each
access to the ED, and use this information to define a
PPS scheme for ED patients. The first indicator we tested
was the triage code. Patients were sorted according to
their triage code, then for each group and with reference
to all the clinical and cost variables of interest, the averageand the confidence intervals were computed. We sub-
sequently clustered patients, by a k-means procedure,
into 20 different classes of total cost to identify the cost
drivers of ED activity. This enabled us to determine
whether triage codes could be used to define a PPS
scheme, or whether additional cost drivers needed to be
included, and if so, which, in order to develop a suitable
algorithm for reimbursement for patients.
The cluster analysis showed that triage codes alone
were not a good candidate, but that the number of
laboratory and non-laboratory tests and examinations was
a key cost driver. Our algorithm therefore combines
the triage code with the number of laboratory and non-
laboratory tests/examinations. We have grouped patients
into three uniform cost classes (A, B, and C) that represent
the classification of our proposed PPS. Our classification
starts from the triage codes. All white codes are
assigned to class A while all yellow and red codes,
which are indistinguishable from a cost point of view,
according to the cluster analysis, are assigned to group C.
Green codes are split among the three groups using
the number of non-laboratory and laboratory tests/
examinations as a discriminant. Any green code patients
who required less than or equal to the average number
of examinations prescribed to white codes were assigned
to group A. Those green code patients whose total cost
was, because of the number of non-laboratory tests/
examinations, at least as high as the cost of the upper
triage group (yellow/red) here grouped into category C.
This procedure then allows us to identify a set of green
code patients, homogeneous in terms of costs, who
represent group B.
The reimbursement for patients in the different groups
was set to discourage any strategic behavior by the hospital
either in terms of upcoding (e.g., from green to yellow) or
downgrading (e.g., from yellow to green).
Finally to test for the reliability of our approach, we
split our sample into two equal parts using the date of
admittance as the discriminant and evaluated the difference
between the actual cost incurred to treat the patients
and the reimbursement the hospital would have received
with our PPS policy.
Ethical considerations
The study was carried out as part of routine checks
conducted in the ED of the hospital and so ethical
approval was not required. As is the case with all studies
conducted in the hospital environment, the management
of the hospital approved the study protocol. The man-
agement is responsible for ensuring the ethical aspects
of all hospital activities. Furthermore, the entire study
was organized in conjunction with ED teams. On entering
the hospital, all patients sign an informed consent form
regarding treatment in the hospital and the terms and
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carried out in full accordance with Italian law on privacy
(Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196).
Data analysis
Data refer to patients who were triaged at the ED of E.O.
Ospedali Galliera in Genoa, Italy, during a sample week
from Thursday 9th December 2010, 8:00 pm until
Thursday 16th December 2010, 8:00 pm. For each patient,
data on personal characteristics, clinical pathway, and
costs were specifically collected for this project. The
electronic data processing center of the ED records the
following information:
i. Date and time of arrival
ii. Medical attendant (the identification code of the
member of staff dealing with the incident)
iii. Triage entry code
iv. Patient’s personal information (in particular, gender
and date of birth)
v. Date and time of first examination
vi. Number and type of laboratory and non-laboratory
tests/examinations
vii. Patient outcome
viii. Date and hour of discharge (patient report
closing time)
This information is not sufficient to allocate medical
and staff costs, which represent a very large component
(around 35%) of the total ED costs [6,15-17]. The time
elapsing between arrival at ED and discharge (which
can be obtained from each patient file) is not a good
approximation of the time required to treat the patient
because of the two-level system to access treatment.
On arrival, the patient is seen by nurses who assign a
specific triage code ranging from white (inappropriate
access) to red (emergency), which determines the priority
for attention from the medical staff. For this reason,
white and green code patients may wait for a long time,
especially when more severe cases are being treated.
For the same reasons, the time elapsing from the first
examination (which represents the moment in which
the patient is taken into care by the ED) and the time the
patient is discharged, cannot be properly used to allocate
medical and staff costs. In fact, patients may have to
stay inside the ED for “observation” due to their health
condition, but this stay does not necessarily require
physicians’ care.
To provide a reliable and analytical imputation of the
time devoted to each patient by physicians, physicians
were asked to make a contemporaneous (at the point at
which the patient file was closed) report of the actual
time they spent treating each patient. At the end of each
shift, the team of researchers checked and collected thedata, asking physicians to fill in any missing data before
they left the ED. Information concerning diagnostic tests
and other medical treatments was provided by the hospital
electronic data processing center. The economic cost
for each test/treatment (such as laboratory tests, non-
laboratory tests and examinations, and x-ray tests) that
each patient actually underwent was then analytically
imputed [18].
The cost per patient consists of three main cost
components:
– physician and other staff costs
– patient-specific direct costs (diagnostic tests, x-ray
tests, laboratory tests, examinations, other)
– ED overhead costs (cleaning, mortgages, kitchen and
laundry, medical devices, other)
The cost per patient was thus estimated via a ‘bottom-up’
approach [19] by adding up the three different components.
All cost data used in the study are in 2010 euros.Physicians and other staff costs
For physicians and other staff costs, an hourly wage was
obtained from the department’s annual balance sheet,
which was then multiplied by the amount of time each
physician stated he/she had devoted to the patient.Patient specific direct costs
The number and the type of tests were provided by the
hospital electronic data processing center and linked to
the other information concerning each patient by the
‘ID entrance code’. The price for laboratory and non-
laboratory tests was determined using the E.O. Galliera
Hospital internal price lista; if this information was not
available, the corresponding regional tariff was used.ED overhead costs
Overhead costs represent 14% of the total ED costs. From
the ED annual balance sheet, we obtained an estimate of
overhead costs for a sample week. The total cost was then
shared among patients, using the time elapsed between
first examination and discharge from ED [20], assuming a
positive correlation between overhead costs and time
spent in the ED. In fact, we believe that this is a reliable
proxy of a patient’s specific consumption of overhead ED
costs, provided that the patient, during his stay, occupies a
bed and absorbs ED resources including cleaning, kitchen
and laundry, and medical devices.Results
Table 1 summarizes the most important characteristics
of our sample.
Table 1 Sample dataset - descriptive statistics and cost composition by triage code
Triage code
White Green Yellow Red All
Obs 81(8.01%) 689(68.15%) 219(21.66%) 22(2.18%) 1011(100%)
Bio & Clinical variables (mean values)
Age 37.83 45.64 64.13 76.18 49.68
[33.91 – 41.74]a [44.11 - 47.17] [61.24 - 67.01] [68.36 - 84.00] [48.30 - 51.06]
Gender (female) 0.64 0.50 0.52 0.45 0.51
[0.54 - 0.75] [0.46 - 0.53] [0.45 - 0.59] [0.23 - 0.68] [0.48 - 0.54]
Time elapsing between 1st exam. and exit 0.52 1.90 4.49 2.18 2.35
[−0.04 - 1.07] [1.70 - 2.10] [3.76 - 5.22] [1.55 - 2.80] [2.13 - 2.54]
N. of non-lab. prescr.. 1.90 3.14 5.08 6.95 3.54
[1.77 - 2.03] [3.02 - 3.26] [4.72 - 5.43] [5.96 - 7.95] [3.41 - 3.67]
N.of lab. prescr. 0.09 0.38 1.14 1.14 0.54
[0.01 - 0.16] [0.33 - 0.43] [1.03 - 1.26] [0.98 - 1.29] [0.49 - 0.59]
N. of lab tests 0.49 3.42 11.88 13.36 5.23
[−0.04 - 1.03] [2.97 - 3.87] [10.99 - 12.76] [11.22 - 15.51] [4.80 - 5.67]
Lab tests per each lab prescr. 5.71 8.96 10.40 11.76 9.71
Time devoted to patients 3.96 7.84 14.49 19.23 9.22
[2.58 - 5.34] [7.39 - 8.29] [13.26 - 15.73] [11.26 - 27.19] [8.73 - 9.72]
Cost variables (mean values)
Total cost 87.83 189.38 340.54 407.39 218.73
[77.08 - 98.58] [181.98 - 196.77] [320.83 - 360.24] [350.41 - 464.37] [210.48 - 226.98]
Medical Doctors 21.02 35.00 59.14 68.80 39.84
[19.75 - 22.30] [34.24 - 35.77] [57.55 - 60.73] [64.73 - 72.87] [38.87 - 40.82]
Nurses- other Personnel- Admin Staff. 19.17 32.89 55.46 63.96 37.36
[17.98 - 20.35] [32.16 - 33.62] [53.97 - 56.96] [60.14 - 67.78] [36.43 - 38.28]
Mortgages. Kitchen & Laundry. Clean & other exp. 1.45 5.66 12.86 6.69 6.91
[−0.02 - 2.92] [5.13 - 6.21] [10.93 - 14.81] [4.77 - 8.62] [6.31 - 7.52]
Health services. Surg. & Med. devices. Drugs 0.42 3.07 4.93 4.38 3.29
[0.13 - 0.73] [2.87 - 3.27] [4.44 - 5.42] [3.12 - 5.64] [3.10 - 3.48]
X-ray 8.26 50.77 97.90 103.85 58.72
[0.32 - 16.21] [46.06 - 55.48] [83.13 - 112.67] [55.61 - 152.10] [53.82 - 63.64]
Non-Lab tests 33.61 34.41 50.60 99.01 39.26
[30.86 - 36.37] [33.06 - 35.77] [47.12 - 54.09] [75.32 - 122.70] [37.79 - 40.73]
Lab tests 1.14 8.02 28.27 32.85 12.40
[−0.04 - 2.32] [6.99 - 9.07] [26.09 - 30.46] [27.39 - 38.31] [11.37 - 13.44]
a95% confidence intervals for means.
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triage code, 22% had a yellow code, and only a small
fraction had a red code.
Patients with more serious triage codes had a higher
average age and there were slightly more women than men
in the white code group. The time between examination
and discharge increased with increasing severity across
the code groups, as expected for the first three codes,although red code patients did not seem to require sig-
nificantly more time than green code patients.
For non-laboratory prescriptions, there was a one-to-
one correspondence with the tests/examinations actually
performed, although this is not the case for laboratory
tests, because they may be prescribed in batches. For
this reason, the number of laboratory prescriptions also
represents a poor proxy for the actual number of tests
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average number of both laboratory and non-laboratory
tests/examinations increases with the severity of the
triage code, as does the average number of laboratory
tests/examinations per prescription.
The distribution of costs by triage code (Figure 1) shows
that although the average cost increases with severity
of coding, the variance within each code is high, thus
suggesting that the triage code alone may not be a good
proxy of the cost per patient. It is also interesting that
the most expensive patients are yellow codes rather
than red, and that the cost of red codes is always within
the range of variation for yellow codes. In other words,
yellow and red codes are indistinguishable from a cost
perspective.
The main results of the cluster analysis are presented
in Figure 2. White codes are clustered in the first cost
classes while green codes span almost all. Red codes are
enveloped by yellow ones. That is, from a cost point of
view, they do not seem to have any distinguishing
characteristics.
Non laboratory tests/examinations emerge as the real
cost driver for ED patients. White codes require an
examination and, in general, no laboratory tests and are
clustered in the first cost classes. As the number of non-
laboratory examinations/tests increases, so does total
cost and the tests comprise an increasing share of that
total. On the basis of these results, we can conclude that
a combination of triage codes and the number of testsFigure 1 Distribution of total cost per patient within each triage codeperformed can be used to design different categories/
groups of ED access, forming the basis of a PPS.
From Table 1, we can see that the average number of
non-laboratory prescriptions for white codes is below
two, with a 95% confidence interval. On average, the
number of non-laboratory prescriptions for green codes
is much higher (3.14). Moreover, almost all white codes
(93% of the total) do not require any laboratory tests
(the average number of laboratory prescriptions per white
code patient is 0.09). For this reason, all green code
patients with fewer than two non-laboratory prescriptions
and no laboratory tests/examinations were grouped with
white codes.
Similarly, green code patients with seven or more non-
laboratory tests/examinations, that is, the average number
for red codes, were included in group C. The economic
analysis shows that the distinction between green and
yellow/red codes mainly depends on the number of tests
that have been prescribed. The average cost for a red/
yellow code is €346.6. The average cost for green codes
with six non-laboratory tests or examinations is €343.5,
for seven is €361, and for eight is €403. That means
that they have a cost well within the yellow/red range.
This allows us to define the following three groups, each
of which is homogeneous from the cost point of view.
Group A
This first group can be considered as ‘inappropriate
access’. It pools white codes with green codes requiring.
Figure 2 Cluster analysis: Triage vs. cost composition.
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non-laboratory examinations.
Group B
The second group consists of green code patients who
required more than two, but fewer than seven non-
laboratory examinations or at least one laboratory test/
examination.
Group C
The third group comprises green code patients requiring
at least seven non-laboratory examinations, and all yellow
and red codes.
Group A contained 291 patients (out of 1011). The actual
per patient average cost was €94, and we suggest that
the reimbursement level set for group A patients should
be the same. Attendance is considered inappropriate for
all white code patients (by definition) and any green
code patients with no laboratory tests/examinations
and a maximum of two non-laboratory tests/examinations.
The proposed PPS policy is summarized in Table 2.
Group B included 449 green code patients. This group
was characterized by an actual average cost of €218, but
the PPS suggested is €222. This means that for each patient
in this group the hospital would gain on average €4.Finally, group C contained 271 patients. The payment
we propose for this group is €347, i.e., a reimbursement
below the actual average cost of €353 that the hospital
incurs when treating these patients. In fact, the PPS is
set equal to the average per patient cost for yellow and
red code patients. Green code patients who receive
more than seven non-laboratory tests/examinations cost
on average more than €347 but they are, deliberately,
underestimated.
Discussion
The analysis presented in this paper is one of the first
attempts of which we are aware to study the relationship
between triage codes and the cost of treating patients in
ED. The data usually available through patients’ files are
not sufficient for the analysis, but we were able to use a
unique dataset that matches patient information with
data specifically collected for this purpose, relating to
the intensity and cost of care.
As a first step towards the definition of a PPS, patients
were grouped according to their triage code and data
summarized in Table 1. A first interesting result emerges:
the time elapsing between examination and discharge
increases with the severity code for the first three codes
(white, green, and yellow), but counter intuitively, red
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to require more time then green. This result may be
explained in several ways: red codes are usually very
critical patients who may be admitted more quickly to
other departments and yellow codes may include patients
who need to be monitored for a longer period than red
codes. Finally, it may well be that, from a cost point of
view, there is no difference between these two. This
intuition seems to be confirmed by data on the time
devoted by medical staff to each patient.
Looking at the number of prescriptions for non-
laboratory and laboratory tests/examinations, we note
that whereas the former increases, as expected, with the
triage code, the latter, surprisingly, does not. This odd
result is actually easily explainable. For non-laboratory
prescriptions, there is a one-to-one correspondence with
the tests/examinations performed, while laboratory tests
are prescribed in batches, hence the number of prescrip-
tions is a poor proxy for the actual number of tests/exami-
nations performed. This is confirmed by the fact that the
average number of tests/examinations per prescription
(see Table 1) increases, as it might be expected, with the
triage code.
Figure 1 provides evidence that crude triage codes
alone cannot be used to design a PPS because of the
high variance within groups. The design of a PPS re-
quires a set of observable variables, possibly outside
the provider’s control, which allow the definition of
homogeneous groups of patients in terms of cost. If
the triage code was a good indicator, costs per triage
code should have a relatively small variance within
each group, whereas the mean of the cost of each
triage code should be significantly different. Several
statistical tests can be performed to check for these
characteristics, but they often imply that the distribu-
tion of the observations is not significantly different
from a normal distribution, a characteristic that our
data do not possess, as shown in Figure 1. The triage
code is a system for priority setting in EDs that should
reflect the severity of a patient’s condition, and not
his/her need for care. Their use for pricing ED care is
therefore controversial.
A further investigation on this issue was made possible
through the identification of 20 clusters. Each cluster
groups patients who are homogeneous in terms of their
total cost. The cluster analysis by cost composition isTable 2 Prospective payment system
Description
Group A White & Green inappropriate
Group B Green with n. of non-lab tests/examinations <7
Group C Green (with n. of non-lab tests/examinations ≥7) + Yellow & Red
Tot.presented in Figure 2. White codes are different in their
cost from yellow/red, while green over-run both categories.
Lower cost classes (prevalence of white and green
codes) mainly require an examination and some tests.
This result may be interpreted in terms of appropriateness
and upcoding. White codes (inappropriate use of ED)
do not need care from this department: an examination
and some reassurance on health status is all that is
required. In Italy, access to ED is free except for white
codes, where a €25 fee is charged. As a consequence, it
may well be possible that in some cases, nurses upcode
patients from white to green, so as to deliver faster and
free treatment.
For higher cost classes, the main cost driver seems to
be non-laboratory tests/examinations. This may well be
explained by the fact that critical patients usually require
treatment from specialists outside the ED and the use of
more sophisticated diagnostic techniques raises the share
of non-laboratory costs. This information can be used to
design a PPS using triage codes, together with the number
of laboratory and non-laboratory tests/examinations as a
discriminant. Furthermore, analysis of Figure 2 seems
to suggest that yellow and red codes are not statistically
different and, in terms of reimbursement, could be
pooled together. Using this information, it was possible
to define three different categories (Groups A, B, and
C) of ED access that could be reimbursed using a PPS.
Group A encompasses inappropriate patients: all the
white code patients and those green code patients requiring
no laboratory tests/examinations and fewer than two
non-laboratory tests/examinations. Green code patients
with these characteristics are indistinguishable, from a
clinical or cost point of view, from white code patients.
In fact, looking at Table 1, it is noticeable that the average
number of non-laboratory tests for white code patients is
less than two (with a 95% confidence interval) and almost
all of the white code patients (93%) do not even require a
laboratory test/examination. In other words, as set out
earlier, we believe that these green patients might have
been upcoded.
For groups B and C, it was necessary to set a reimburse-
ment that would give the right incentives to contain costs
and limit upcoding from green to red/yellow. We aimed
to shift reimbursement from high- to low-cost patients by
setting a tariff for group B that was slightly higher than
the average observed cost.N.Obs Actual mean cost Total PPS Total Diff. % Diff
291 94 27354 94 27354 0 0,00%
449 218 97882 222 99678 1796 1.83%
271 353 95663 347 94037 1626 −1.69%
1011 220899 221069 170 0,07%
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discouraged because less complicated green code patients
are reimbursed at the same level as white code patients.
However, upcoding from A to B may still occur, especially
for patients who are quite close to the threshold.
Upcoding from group B to C is certainly not expedient:
the threshold is very high and the additional reimbursement
is well below the actual cost incurred. Finally, it should
be noted that, to balance the accounts, the reimbursement
for group B is actually higher than the cost incurred.
Green codes with fewer than seven non-laboratory tests/
examinations have an actual average cost of €218 per
patient, but we propose a reimbursement of €222.
This result is well in line with suggestions in the agency
literature. In the presence of asymmetry of information
and unseen actions, it is in fact optimal to increase the
reimbursement for the best-case scenario (green code
patient, not complicated) and reduce the payment for
the worst state (green code patient, complicated). In
this way, hospitals have no interest in upcoding (increasing
the number of non-laboratory tests/examinations) but
instead, receive the extra profit assigned to group B
patients when they are able to contain the number of
tests/examinations and, by this behavior, get a more
profitable reimbursement.
In our system, most green codes (which are also the
largest group of patients admitted to the department)
are in the B group, which is generously reimbursed and
for whom a reduction in the number of tests/examinations
can lead to an increase in hospital profits. From this
perspective, our system should offer an ED enough
incentive to ensure the appropriate use of testing.
Nonetheless, our policy may induce hospitals to increase
the number of prescribed treatments for ‘borderline’ green
code patients [21]. A shift from group A to group B would
give hospitals a substantial increase in reimbursement.
In our sample, there were 162 ‘borderline’ green code
patients, defined as patients who, in the sample week,Table 3 Simulations for PPS
1st sample
N.Obs Actual mean cost Total
Group A 146 91.51 13359.91
Group B 224 216.58 48515.02
Group C 135 358.07 48340.07
Tot. 505 110215.00
2nd sample
N.Obs Actual mean cost Total
Group A 145 96.72 14024.07
Group B 225 219.81 49457.14
Group C 136 348.82 47439.52
Tot. 506 110920.73required no laboratory tests and two non-laboratory
tests/examinations, i.e., about 16% of the total number
of patients. To show the possible effects of upcoding,
we carried out a simulation where all these patients
were upcoded. In this case, the hospital would increase
its income by about 9%. This would be the worst scenario.
To upcode patients it is necessary to inflate non-labora-
tory tests/examinations, i.e., specialist consultations and
x-rays. This may be very difficult to justify and can be easily
detected, and is therefore deemed unlikely to happen very
often in practice.
Finally, to test the reliability of our approach, the sample
was split into two equal parts using the date of admittance
as the discriminant. In so doing, we were interested in
evaluating the difference between the actual cost incurred
to treat patients and the reimbursement the hospital
would have received with the new reimbursement policy
(Table 3).
Our system allows the difference between actual cost
and reimbursement to be kept to a minimum. The re-
imbursement proposed overestimates the cost of the
first sample and underestimates the second because, by
construction, it allows accounts to be balanced over the
whole period. What is relevant is by how little the proposed
PPS under- and overestimates the actual cost. In the first
period, the difference is 0.07% and in the second −0.13%.
This implies that our system is quite robust in terms of
predicting the actual cost of EDs.
Limitations
The present work uses data from a single hospital and for
a limited period of time. This may reduce the robustness
of the results obtained.
A second limitation concerns the criteria used to dis-
tribute some of the indirect costs. For instance, the time
elapsing between first examination and discharge is used
to attribute the share of overhead ED costs to each pa-
tient. The rationale for this choice is that patients,PPS Total Diff. % Diff
94 13724 364.09 2.73%
222 49728 1212.98 2.5%
347 46845 −1495.07 −3.09%
110297 82.00 0.07%
PPS Total Diff. % Diff
94 13630 −394.07 −2.81%
222 49950 492.86 0.99%
347 47192 −247.52 −0.52%
110772 −148.73 −0.13%
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However, it is possible that the time elapsed may not in
fact be an accurate proxy for use of resources, for example,
if some overheads are not time-dependent, or do not
depend on the number of patients present.
A further limitation concerns the fact that asking staff
to self-report time devoted to patients introduces an
unavoidable bias in the computations. Several techniques
could be adopted to reduce this problem (see, for example,
[16]) by a sort of standardization of the data. However,
standardization presents the drawback of artificially
rescaling the actual time declared. In other words, some
information may be lost. For this reason we have chosen
to retain the original data.
Last but not least, it is important to note that any pro-
spective payment system that includes the number/volume
of tests to determine the amount of payment is vulnerable
to the unintended consequence of incentivizing unneces-
sary or avoidable testing to move a visit from one level of
payment to a higher one. This would negate the expected
efficiency gains, which are the main reason why PPS are
implemented.Conclusions
Most healthcare systems use retrospective reimbursement
systems for EDs, which may not be efficient for several
reasons. A PPS would solve some of the problems, but the
high level of uncertainty and the variability in the cost of
resources needed to treat each patient is a serious hurdle
to the use of such a payment system. The aim of this study
was to provide an accurate estimate of the actual cost the
hospital incurs when treating patients in the ED and to
propose a reimbursement system for this important part
of hospital activity. For this purpose, we merged data
contained in patient files with the results of monitoring
the costs of the ED of E.O. Ospedali Galliera for a week.
We found that although crude triage codes cannot be used
to reimburse an ED, if they are combined with the number
of laboratory and non-laboratory examinations, it is pos-
sible to cluster admissions to ED into three sufficiently
homogeneous groups and each patient may be assigned
to a specific group whose cost can be reimbursed using
a PPS.
The PPS has been tested on our dataset. The results of
a simulation suggest that our system may be robust
enough to be used to reimburse for this activity. It shows
a good ability to match reimbursement and actual cost
incurred by the hospital.
Such a policy should discourage strategic behavior and
allow the ED to break even, but one major limitation is
that it may create an incentive for hospitals to increase
the number of test/examinations to a fraction of green
code patients to get a higher reimbursement.Endnote
aThe ‘internal price list’ provides the actual cost incurred
by E.O. Ospedali Galliera in providing diagnostic tests
or other services. The price is obtained by a bottom-up
methodology by which all the costs that contribute to the
overall production cost of that particular good or service
are included in the computation of the final ‘price’.
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